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Abstract
The de Broglie-Bohm theory of quantum mechanics (here simply called
Bohmian Mechanics or BM) [1-10] is an augmentation of “bare” quantum
mechanics (the bare theory being given by an algebra of operators and a
quantum state that sets the expectation values of these operators) that in-
cludes a definite history or Bohmian trajectory. This definite trajectory gives
BM a somewhat more classical flavor than most other forms of quantum me-
chanics (QM) (though the trajectory certainly has highly nonlocal and other
nonclassical aspects in its evolution), but to see whether or not this makes a
difference for observations by conscious beings, one needs to attach theories
of conscious perceptions to BM and other forms of QM. Here I shall propose
various forms of theories of consciousness for BM, which I shall call Sensi-
ble Bohmian Mechanics (SBM), and compare them with a proposal I have
made for a theory of consciousness attached to bare QM, which I call Sensible
Quantum Mechanics (SQM) [11-15]. I find that only certain special forms of
SBM would give essentially similar predictions as SQM, though a wider class
might be in practice indistinguishable to any single observer. I also remain
sceptical that a viable complete form of SBM will turn out to be as simple a
description of the universe as a viable complete form of SQM, but of course
it is too early to know yet what the form of the simplest complete theory of
our universe is.
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I should explain at the outset that my attempt to incorporate consciousness
within physics is nonstandard, since most physicists would probably consider this
attempt premature, or simply not part of physics. I agree that it is probably pre-
mature to try to give a complete detailed theory of consciousness, but since we have
developed mathematical frameworks like mechanics for describing other aspects of
the universe, even though we do not yet know the correct complete detailed form of
the mechanics describing our universe, it surely would be helpful to try to develop
a mathematical framework for describing consciousness, even though we are a very
long way from a correct complete detailed theory for it. The objection that con-
sciousness is not part of physics may be historically valid as a sociological analysis of
what most physicists actually study (for the reason, I would guess, that physics con-
centrates on the simplest fundamental descriptions of aspects of our universe, and
so far consciousness does not seem to be simple enough to be included in physics).
However, physics has historically continued to be extended to describe a broader
and broader range of aspects of our universe, so that in some branches of physics
there is even talk today of ‘theories of everything.’ Thus it seems plausible to me
that physics should eventually attempt to describe consciousness itself. Certainly
talk of ‘theories of everything’ in physics seems rather hollow if physics is required
to refuse to consider consciousness.
Furthermore, physics, unlike mathematics, is generally seen to be rooted in ex-
periment and observations, and these fundamentally come down to conscious expe-
rience. This is particularly true in quantum mechanics, where in many formulations
observations are crucial. If one refuses to consider conscious observations, then there
seems to be nothing wrong or lacking in bare QM, though then it is just a beau-
tiful mathematical theory for an unconscious world that is totally divorced from
observations. However, precisely at the stage at which one wants to explain what is
consciously observed, one needs at least some glimpse of a framework for connect-
ing consciousness to observations. Under the assumption that classical mechanics
(CM) correctly described our universe, many physicists usually imagined, I suspect,
some simple idealized form of psycho-physical parallelism in which the content of
one’s conscious perception is very similar to certain aspects of the configuration of
the classical universe. Then, say, if one looked at a clock whose hands were at the
12 o’clock position, one would have a conscious perception that the clock read 12
o’clock.
One of the problems of ordinary QM is that this simple form of psycho-physical
parallelism that seemed adequate in CM does not work in such a na¨ıvely straight-
forward way. Even though many physicists do not explicitly wish to consider any
theories of consciousness, I suspect that much of the trouble they have with QM
arises from the fact that they actually implicitly have something like this simple
form of psycho-physical parallelism sketched above, and then they find difficulty
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fitting it with QM. This is indeed one of the main motivations for BM, since it has
a definite trajectory, with a definite position in configuration space (e.g., definite
particle positions) at each time, to which the simple form of psycho-physical par-
allelism can readily be attached. Since the sketch of a theory of consciousness is
probably implicit in many physicists’ assumptions, one does not need to refer to it
explicitly when one extols the merits of a definite trajectory in BM, which one can
thus do without making other physicists uncomfortable by mentioning the subject
of consciousness that physicists do not really understand very well yet.
However, since Sensible Quantum Mechanics [11-15] gives a glimpse of a frame-
work for a psycho-physical parallelism to the quantum world that appears to be just
as adequate (though of course just as sketchy in detail) as the simple form implicitly
assumed for a classical world, one can see at least this one general possibility for
overcoming the problem that many physicists have in relating QM with conscious
observations (a problem made worse by a reluctance to consider consciousness ex-
plicitly and to acknowledge one’s na¨ıve preconceptions about it). SQM seemed
extremely obvious when I hit upon it, so initially it was surprising to me that it had
not been developed many years ago (though I did later find that Lockwood [16] had
a few years ago expressed highly concordant ideas in less mathematical form). It
occurred to me that the novelty of SQM was perhaps simply because of physicists’
reluctance to consider consciousness explicitly and because of the strong psycho-
logical hold on their assumptions of the simple form of psycho-physical parallelism
possible for the classical world.
In view of the apparent success of SQM in sketching how QM may be combined
with consciousness with virtually none of the traditional interpretive problems (at
least in my own eyes; most physicists I have talked to still seem to think that any
theory of consciousness is either unnecessary or premature), it may be of interest to
develop also an SBM theory to combine BM in a similar way with consciousness.
Then one can have two similar frameworks, containing consciousness explicitly rather
than merely implicitly as has unfortunately too often been done, for comparing
ordinary QM with BM. Since in my nonstandard view I consider SQM (which is
the bare QM of an algebra of operators and a quantum state, with no measurement
hypothesis or collapse of the wavefunction, augmented by a theory of consciousness
connected to the bare QM by a nonclassical form of psycho-physical parallelism)
to be superior to all other forms of ordinary QM, I shall not bother comparing my
SBM extension of BM to other forms of QM, but only to what in my biased opinion
I consider to be the best form of ordinary QM with consciousness, SQM.
Since BM is even at the unconscious level an augmentation of bare QM, it would
be simplest to describe first SQM and then show how it can be augmented to SBM.
SQM is given by the following three basic postulates or axioms [13]:
Quantum World Axiom: The unconscious “quantum world” Q is completely
described by an appropriate algebra of operators and by a suitable state σ (a positive
linear functional of the operators) giving the expectation value 〈O〉 ≡ σ[O] of each
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operator O.
Conscious World Axiom: The “conscious world”M , the set of all perceptions
p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of M .
Quantum-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for each set S of
conscious perceptions is given by the expectation value of a corresponding “aware-
ness operator” A(S), a positive-operator-valued (POV) measure [17], in the state σ
of the quantum world:
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 ≡ σ[A(S)]. (1)
Here the Quantum World Axiom is the basic axiom of the mechanics of bare
QM, and the Conscious World Axiom is the basic postulate I shall make about
the conscious world, even when I go from SQM to SBM. Perhaps I should remind
the reader [13] that a perception p is in this context taken to mean the entirety
of a single conscious experience, all that one is consciously aware of or consciously
experiencing at one moment, the total “raw feel” that one has at one time, or [16]
a “phenomenal perspective” or “maximal experience.”
Besides a modification of the Quantum World Axiom in BM, in SBM I shall also
modify the Quantum-Consciousness Connection, though in both SQM and SBM
I shall assume that the measure for each set of conscious perceptions is given by
some functional of the corresponding quantum or mechanical world. In SQM the
measure is a functional of the operators and the quantum state, and I made the
simplest assumption that this functional is linear in the quantum state and is the
expectation value of a particular operator (an “awareness operator” A(S)) for each
set S of perceptions. Of course, one could readily contemplate generalizations in
which the measure is a nonlinear functional of expectation values [13], but I shall
not do that here.
Bohmian mechanics is most simply given in the case in which a quantum state
is given by a time-dependent wavefunction over some configuration space (say, for
simplicity, of particle positions). One augments this quantum state by a history or
time-parametrized trajectory in this configuration space with the velocity vector at
each point being given by a suitable functional of the wavefunction (a normalized
gradient of its phase for spinless particles) [1-10]. This gives a first-order differential
equation for the trajectory, so it is uniquely determined by this equation (which is
itself uniquely determined by the wavefunction except at its zeros, but those isolated
points do not cause any trouble) and by the position of the trajectory at any one
(e.g., initial) time.
Because BM thus has a trajectory as well as a quantum state, there are in
principle more things on which the measure for conscious perceptions can depend.
Again assuming a linear (if nontrivial) dependence on the quantum state, I shall
propose that Sensible Bohmian Mechanics (SBM) is given by the following three
axioms:
Bohmian World Axiom: The unconscious “Bohmian world” B is described
by a normalized time-dependent Hilbert-space wavefunction ψ(x, t) (obeying an ap-
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propriate Schro¨dinger equation that determines the wavefunction at all times t once
it is given at one time) on a configuration space with coordinates x (indices sup-
pressed) and by a Bohmian trajectory T in this configuration space whose velocity
is given by a suitable functional of the wavefunction.
Conscious World Axiom: The “conscious world”M , the set of all perceptions
p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of M .
Bohmian-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for each set S of
conscious perceptions is given by the expectation value of a corresponding “aware-
ness operator” A(S, T ), a positive-operator-valued (POV) measure [17] that depends
on the Bohmian trajectory T , in the wavefunction of the Bohmian world:
µ(S) =
∫
dxψ∗(x, t0)A(S, T )ψ(x, t0). (2)
(Here the integral can be taken at any time t0, since the Schro¨dinger equation
determines the wavefunction at all times from its form at time t0, though of course
the form of A(S, T ) would depend on the particular t0 chosen. Also, for simplicity,
I am suppressing possible spin indices on the wavefunction as well as the coordinate
indices on the x that denotes a point in the multi-dimensional configuration space.)
As in SQM [13], so in SBM it is convenient to hypothesize that the set M of all
possible conscious perceptions p is a suitable topological space with a prior measure
µ0(S) =
∫
S
dµ0(p). (3)
Then, just as for SQM, the linearity of positive-valued-operator measures over sets
allows one to write the awareness operators for SBM as
A(S, T ) =
∫
S
E(p, T )dµ0(p), (4)
a generalized sum or integral of SBM “experience operators” or “perception opera-
tors” E(p, T ) for the individual perceptions p. Similarly, one can write the measure
on a set of perceptions S as
µ(S) =
∫
S
dµ(p) =
∫
S
m(p)dµ0(p), (5)
in terms of a measure density m(p) that is the quantum expectation value of the
experience operator E(p, T ) for the same perception p:
m(p) =
∫
dxψ∗(x, t0)E(p, T )ψ(x, t0). (6)
It is simplest to consider the two extreme cases in which, for each S or p, µ(S) or
m(p) depends only on the wavefunction ψ(x) or on T . In the first of these cases, one
essentially has a form of SQM with the quantum world consisting of a state that
has the particular form of a time-dependent Hilbert-space wavefunction on some
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configuration and of operators on such wavefunctions, and with the Bohmian world
consisting of this quantum world augmented by the Bohmian trajectory T . However,
in this case the Bohmian trajectory has absolutely no effect on the conscious world
with its perceptions and measures. Since our perceptions are the only direct contact
we have with the world, if they are completely unaffected by the Bohmian trajectory,
there would then seem to be no motivation to add them to one’s theory of the
quantum world. Although it indeed fits my own prejudice not to augment bare
QM for the unconscious aspects of the world and thus not to bother with any
Bohmian trajectory in theories of the quantum world that I prefer, for the purpose
of the present discussion on BM and its extension to SBM it would seem better
to consider a Bohmian-Consciousness Connection in which the Bohmian trajectory
really does have an effect on the measure for sets of perceptions. As discussed above,
a motivation for the trajectory in BM is that its point in configuration space at each
time seems closer to the content of conscious perceptions than does the quantum
state or wavefunction itself.
The second extreme possibility is that for each S or p, µ(S) or m(p) depends
only on the trajectory T . This can be accomplished in Eqs. (2) or (6) by having
A(S, T ) or E(p, T ) not have any nontrivial dependence on x but simply be an S- or
p-dependent numerical function purely of T , say A(S, T ) = a(S, T ) (i.e., a function
purely of S and of T times the identity operator in the wavefunction Hilbert space, so
for a normalized wavefunction, one gets µ(S) = a(S, T )), or, say, E(p, T ) = e(p, T )
(so then m(p) = e(p, T )).
In this case one might say that he could simply dispense with the wavefunction
ψ(x, t), since the measure for one’s perceptions would then depend only on the
Bohmian trajectory T . However, the time dependence of this trajectory depends in
a simple way upon the wavefunction, so the latter could still be a useful element
in giving the simplest description of the trajectory upon which the measure for
perceptions depends. (Similarly, one could in principle dispense with the quantum
or Bohmian world altogether and consider merely the existence of the conscious
world, or actually even only one’s own present conscious perception within it, as
that is all he has direct experience of, but the description of even just one’s own
present conscious perception by itself may be simpler if one postulates a whole
conscious world with many measured sets of perceptions, and a description of this
conscious world by itself may also be simpler if one postulates the existence of a
quantum or Bohmian world on which it depends. I personally also believe that a
description of the full SQM or SBM world would be simpler if one postulates the
existence of an omniscient, omnipotent God as the Creator of this world, but of
course this further extrapolation from direct conscious experience takes one beyond
what is traditionally called physics to metaphysics.)
If for each S and p, A(S, T ) and E(p, T ) are the purely numerical functions
(or functionals) a(S, T ) and e(p, T ) of the trajectory T , with no dependence on
the wavefunction, there is still the question of what kind of functions of T they
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are. In principle they could be nonlocal functionals of the entire trajectory, so that
one’s perception depended on the entire Bohmian history. The fact that we do not
normally perceive much detail about the future might be taken to suggest that there
is a time t(p) associated with each perception, and that e(p, T ) depends only on the
part of the trajectory at times at and earlier than t(p). The dependence on the
part of T at times earlier than t(p) might then be postulated to give the memory
components of perceptions.
However, the fact that drugs and physical conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease
seem to have a strong effect on memory suggests to me that it is more plausible to
assume that the memory components of present perceptions are directly caused by
present physical conditions (perhaps having something to do with neural connec-
tions in the brain) rather than being caused directly by past conditions such as the
past part of the Bohmian trajectory. Thus even if the measure density m(p) for a
perception p were determined entirely by the Bohmian trajectory T rather than by
it and by the quantum state (or entirely by the quantum state, as in SQM, which
I personally prefer), I would think it to be the simplest plausible assumption that
m(p) is determined by the trajectory at the single time t(p), which can be consid-
ered to be the time of the perception (something not well defined in SQM except in
rather ad hoc ways [13]). In other words, I am claiming that it seems simplest to
suppose that each conscious perception is directly only of the present, though that
present can include the records that produce the perception components of memory.
Of course, it may be an extreme idealization to suppose that the dependence
is on precisely that single time rather than being spread out over, say, one Planck
time. But I see no evidence that each of our perceptions need be directly affected
by anything in the unconscious quantum or Bohmian world spread out over a time
long in, say, seconds. Although a second is admittedly very long compared with the
Planck time, it is certainly much shorter than cosmological times, and there is no
evidence that I see that puts a lower limit on the time over which the unconscious
quantum or Bohmian world affects a single conscious perception (unless one adopts
a theory in which instants and time periods less than some lower limit simply do
not exist).
Even if the measure density m(p) for a perception p is determined entirely by the
Bohmian trajectory at the instant t(p), there is still the question of what aspect of
the trajectory at that instant determines m(p). In principle, it could be determined
by the position, velocity, acceleration, and/or higher time derivatives of the position
in the configuration space x as a function of time t, evaluated at the time t(p).
If one wants to get the closest agreement between an SQM theory and a version
of SBM with m(p) depending purely on the Bohmian trajectory, it seems that one
should select the following features in one’s choice of the SQM and the SBM:
(1) The SQM and SQM should have the same bare quantum world, a normalized
time-dependent Hilbert-space wavefunction on some configuration space.
(2) The position x0 of the Bohmian trajectory T at time t0 should be chosen ran-
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domly with the probability distribution given by the quantum “probability” density
ψ∗(x, t0)ψ(x, t0). (The Bohmian equation for the velocity of the trajectory as the
gradient of the phase of the wavefunction ensures that if one selects a continuum
ensemble of trajectories such that at time t0 their measure density in the configura-
tion space is the quantum “probability” density ψ∗(x, t0)ψ(x, t0) at that time, then
the measure density of this ensemble of trajectories is carried forward in time such
that at time t it is precisely the quantum “probability” density ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t) at
that new time t. In this sense the “random” probability distribution ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t)
preserves its functional dependence on the wavefunction ψ(x, t) at all times.)
(3) The SQM should have each of its experience operatorsE(p) being a projection
operator P (s(p), t(p)) onto a subset s(p) of the configuration space and at a time
t(p) that both depend on the perception p.
(4) The SBM should have each of its experience operators being of the form
E(p, T ) = e(p, T ) and having a nonzero constant value (say 1) if the trajectory T at
the time t(p) (the same function of the perception p as in the corresponding SQM
theory) is within the subset s(p) of the configuration space (the same subset for each
p as in the corresponding SQM theory), and having the value zero if the trajectory
at time t(p) is not within s(p).
Even in this idealized correspondence between SQM and SBM theories, one will
not get for each the same measure density m(p) for individual perceptions or the
same measure µ(S) for sets of perceptions. However, if one enlarged the BM and
SBM theories to Continuum Bohmian Mechanics (CBM) and Sensible Continuum
Bohmian Mechanics (SCBM) theories respectively that are hereby defined to in-
clude a whole continuum ensemble of trajectories, with their measure density given
by ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t) at any time t (whose preservation at all times is guaranteed by
the Bohmian equation of evolution for each trajectory in the ensemble), then one
would get agreement if one integrated, over the measured continuum ensemble of all
trajectories, the m(p), and hence also the µ(S), that one gets from each trajectory
in the particular SBM theory with its own individual trajectory. In contrast, for a
particular SBM theory with its own particular trajectory T , one would get a zero
measure for any set S of perceptions p which all give configuration-space subsets
s(p) that the particular trajectory T is not in at the corresponding times t(p). (On
the other hand, any set of perceptions with nonzero measure in any particular SBM
theory would necessarily have a nonzero measure in the corresponding SQM theory
when features (1)-(4) hold for the pair of corresponding theories.)
Nevertheless, the fact that each perception p that actually occurs (i.e., that has
a nonzero measure density) has no direct awareness of any other perception means
that one cannot absolutely test whether or not one is in an SBM universe in which
another perception p′, with the particular trajectory T not in the configuration-space
subspace s(p′) at the time t(p′) and hence withm(p′) = 0, does not actually occur, or
whether one is in the corresponding SCBM or SQM universe in which m(p′) > 0 so
that this other perception p′ does actually occur. It seems that perhaps the best one
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can do is to compare what the corresponding SBM and SQM theories give for the
typicality of the perception p (the fraction of the measure of other perceptions p′ that
have a measure density not greater than that of p, or some modification of this such
as the dual typicality [13]). Although if the features (1)-(4) proposed above hold,
the corresponding SCBM and SQM theories would give the same typicality for each
perception, even the typicality for an existing perception in the SBM theory and that
for the same perception in the corresponding SQM theory would differ. However, one
might hope that for a reasonably large fraction of individual Bohmian trajectories,
chosen randomly out of the continuum ensemble with the ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t) measure
density, most of the measure of the actually existing perceptions in the resulting
particular SBM theory would occur for a set of actually existing perceptions whose
typicalities would not be too low in either that particular SBM theory or in the
corresponding SQM theory. If this were true (and its truth might well depend on
the form of the underlying bare quantum theory, i.e., on the wavefunction, so that
this could well be a question worth further investigation), then the typicality of most
existing perceptions would not give a strong test between a particular SBM theory
that predicted its existence and the corresponding SQM theory.
The fact that one’s perception p cannot absolutely rule out any SBM or SQM
theory that gives it a nonzero measure density m(p), and the fact that one can
apparently only use something like the typicality of the perception (interpreted as the
likelihood or conditional probability for the perception given the theory) to weight
the prior probability assigned to the theory in a Bayesian analysis to get the posterior
probability for the theory [13], means that even if one has a pair of SQM and SBM
theories that do not share the features (1)-(4) above, one’s actual perception will not
necessarily rule out either of these theories. But, crudely speaking, the greater the
degree to which the features (1)-(4) are not held by the pair of theories, the greater
the possibility apparently is that the typicalities assigned by the two theories to
one’s perception will differ sufficiently greatly that one can use them to deduce a
very low posterior probability to one or the other of the pair of theories.
Of course, I should emphasize that the “one” who is postulated to be doing the
comparison of typicalities must be one who can indeed calculate them from the SQM
and SBM theories in question. In practice this might be possible only for a being of
such intelligence that he, she, or it (or whatever is the correct pronoun for such a
being that may not have any sex and yet is more intelligent than we usually ascribe
to “things”) can exist only outside our universe. Those of us within the universe
might be expected to be able to get only a very crude estimate of such typicalities,
but if one can even see roughly that they differ by many orders of magnitude between
two theories, that would be sufficient to get a reasonably good idea of which theory
to reject (except in the case in which the prior probabilities differed by roughly the
same number of orders of magnitude in the opposite direction).
There is also the apparently completely subjective question of what prior prob-
abilities to assign different SQM and SBM theories before weighting them with the
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typicalities of one’s perception in a Bayesian analysis to get the posterior proba-
bilities for the theories. (I say “apparently,” since conceivably there is an actual
existing measured set of different universes, each described by a different SQM or
SBM theory, so that the actual measure of these universes gives an ontologically
objective prior frequency-type probability to the different theories describing the
different universes, but since we certainly do not have access to all of these con-
ceivable universes or know their measure even if it does exist objectively, for us
epistemologically the prior measure must surely be subjective.) Here I should lay
my cards on the table and explain the prejudices that I have against assigning BM
and SBM theories high prior probabilities.
First, I should say that I would prefer to assign higher prior probabilities to
simpler theories. Perhaps most physicists would agree, but they might differ on how
to weight or even how to rank the simplicity of different theories. (I suspect that
this may lie at the core of more metaphysical disagreements as well, such as whether
theism or atheism is true.)
I myself think that adding the Bohmian trajectory to bare quantum mechanics
reduces the simplicity and thus the prior probability I would assign to the theory.
Perhaps for nonrelativistic QM, the extension to CBM with its continuum of tra-
jectories that have the ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t) measure density is not too great a loss of
simplicity, since this ensemble of trajectories does not take too much additional in-
formation to specify and has certain nice properties (such as the measure density’s
remaining ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t) for all time). However, to pick out a single trajectory
from this ensemble for a particular BM (as opposed to CBM) theory would seem to
require much more ad hoc information. I can think of certain choices that do not
require too much additional information, such as choosing the trajectory whose time
integral of ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t) evaluated along the trajectory itself is the maximum out
of all possible Bohmian trajectories, but even these relatively simple choices seem
rather ad hoc and ugly.
Incidentally, I might point out that one could have theories of Generalized Con-
tinuum Bohmian Mechanics (GCBM), and its augmentation of Sensible Generalized
Continuum Bohmian Mechanics (SGCBM) to include the Conscious World Axiom
and the (suitably generalized, as discussed above for SCBM) Bohmian-Consciousness
Connection, in which there is a continuum of Bohmian trajectories with a measure
density that is a general normalized nonnegative function over the configuration
space at any one time and which is transported to other times by the Bohmian
equation for the velocity of the trajectories. One could then say that CBM is the
special case (probably the simplest) in which this measure density is ψ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t),
and ordinary BM with its single trajectory is the special case in which the measure
density at any one time is a delta-function distribution (not so simple, as discussed
above, since one must specify the location of this delta-function at one time.) How-
ever, even within the wide set of possibilities of GCBM or SGCBM theories, I do
not see any so simple as simply leaving out the trajectories altogether, as in bare
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QM and SQM theories.
Now a supporter of BM might object that although BM is almost certainly more
complicated than bare QM in requiring the extra element of the Bohmian trajectory,
in another way it is simpler in not requiring any operators on the Hilbert space of
wavefunctions (except presumably for the Hamiltonian that generates the evolution
by the Schro¨dinger equation). However, once the Hilbert space of wavefunctions is
defined, it takes very little additional information to define the set of operators on
this space that maps it into itself. Perhaps this additional information is comparable
to that for the continuum ensemble of trajectories in CBM, so I would admit that
CBM is of comparable simplicity to bare QM for the same Hilbert space (though
specifying a precise single trajectory in ordinary BM seems to me in general more
complicated). But even in a comparison with CBM, the framework of bare QM
allows a much greater range of possibilities for the quantum state than the restriction
to a wavefunction over configuration space (or some slight generalizations to include
spin, etc.) that seems to be necessary for present formulations of BM and CBM, and
it might turn out that a quantum state that cannot be written as a wavefunction
will be at the heart of the simplest complete description of the universe.
A supporter of BM might also object that even if BM is indeed more complicated
than bare QM in having its Bohmian trajectory, when one attaches a theory of
consciousness, the result is simpler if one can attach it to a theory with a trajectory.
For example, in the Sensible theories outlined above, a supporter of SBM over
SQM might say that BM allows simpler awareness operators A(S, T ) (e.g., of the
form a(S, T ), with no nontrivial dependence on the wavefunction) in the Bohmian-
Consciousness Connection of SBM than the awareness operators A(S) allowed in
the Quantum-Consciousness Connection of SQM, and that the increased simplicity
of A(S, T ) over A(S) overbalances the extra complication of the trajectory in SBM.
I will admit that it is hard to answer this objection when we are as ignorant as we
are about the connection of consciousness to the rest of physics (e.g., about what
the awareness operators are in Sensible theories), but I should say that at present I
for one am rather sceptical that a viable SBM theory will turn out to be as simple
as a viable SQM theory.
Another problem I have with BM theories is that when I imagine applying them
to relativistic fields instead of to nonrelativistic particles, I find that even if the
quantum state is Lorentz invariant (e.g., the vacuum state), almost all the trajecto-
ries are not, and neither is the continuum ensemble of CBM. For example, consider
for simplicity a free scalar field. Each plane-wave mode of the field can be considered
to be an harmonic oscillator, and the vacuum state of the field can be considered
to be a product of the ground states of all of these modes. For such a static state
of zero energy, the wavefunction has a constant phase with zero gradient in the
configuration space (the space of amplitudes of the modes), so the Bohmian trajec-
tory is static. When one superposes the static amplitudes for the modes, one gets
an arbitrary space-dependent static configuration of the scalar field as its Bohmian
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trajectory. Except for the special homogeneous cases in which this static configu-
ration is precisely the configuration of constant field everywhere (which in the case
of zero field is the one proposed above whose time integral of ψ∗ψ evaluated along
the trajectory itself is the maximum out of all possible Bohmian trajectories), these
Bohmian trajectories are not Lorentz invariant, for the spatial dependence in the
frame in which their evolution was calculated by the Bohmian equation of motion
becomes a temporal dependence in any other frame.
Furthermore, in any other frame the trajectory which does not even satisfy the
Bohmian equation of motion, so the situation is worse than the version of sponta-
neous symmetry breaking in which the quantum state is not invariant under the
symmetry group of the equations which it solves. In that case the action of an
element of the symmetry group on the nonsymmetric solution yields another non-
symmetric solution, but for the inhomogeneous Bohmian trajectories, the action of a
Lorentz transformation on them yields time-dependent trajectories that do not even
satisfy the Bohmian equations for trajectories. (I am grateful to Shelly Goldstein
for pointing out the importance of this distinction.)
Of course, one could say that perhaps Lorentz invariance is just a useful ap-
proximation to certain aspects of the world and need not apply to the Bohmian
trajectories. After all, in our perceptions there are objects that seem to have fairly
definite velocities (with the bulk of nearby ones, such as the earth, being fairly near
zero in our local frame) that appear to break Lorentz invariance, so presumably
there is nothing blatantly inconsistent with observations to have Bohmian trajecto-
ries breaking Lorentz invariance even when the quantum state is Lorentz invariant.
However, this lack of Lorentz invariance for all but the homogeneous Bohmian tra-
jectories for a quantum field in the Lorentz-invariant vacuum state, and the need to
define a preferred velocity in order to define the Bohmian equations for the trajec-
tories, seems at least aesthetically rather ugly.
I suspect that there would be an even greater degree of ugliness if one at-
tempted to devise a Bohmian version of quantum gravity, say for the quantum
cosmology of closed universes. If one has a solution of the Wheeler-DeWitt equa-
tion for canonically-quantized general relativity, this gives a wavefunctional of three-
geometries that is invariant not only under coordinate transformations of the spatial
hypersurface, but also under the equivalent of time translations that are arbitrary at
each point of space. Unlike the case of quantum field theory in Minkowski spacetime,
in which only one quantum state (the vacuum) has the full Lorentz invariance of the
Minkowski spacetime itself, in canonical quantum gravity every physical state has
the diffeomorphism invariance (including local Lorentz invariance) of general coor-
dinate transformations. It is not clear to me how to construct a Bohmian trajectory
for such a theory of quantum cosmology without breaking this diffeomorphism in-
variance in a complicated and ugly ad hoc way.
I would also suspect that if one tries to overcome the severe technical problems
of constructing a finite theory of gravity by going from a field theory of general
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relativity to a superstring theory, it would be even more cumbersome and ugly to
try to construct a Bohmian trajectory. Of course, the bare QM of superstrings at
the nonperturbative level is hardly understood at the moment, and virtually nothing
is known of how to produce consciousness out of it (say by some form of awareness
operators), so one cannot pretend to be certain that this task will be easier without
constructing a BM version of superstrings, but I personally suspect that the latter
would be simply an onerous burden that is unnecessary. It would seem much more
plausible that one should go directly from a bare quantum theory of superstrings (or
whatever the ultimate quantum theory is, assuming that it is a quantum theory) to
a theory of consciousness (say given in terms of the unconscious quantum world by
expectation values of awareness operators in SQM), without bothering with trying
to find a BM theory with a definite trajectory.
In conclusion, I have outlined how a theory of consciousness may be attached
to the Bohmian version of quantum mechanics (BM) to give what I call Sensible
Bohmian Mechanics (SBM), in a way highly analogous to the way in which I have
proposed attached a theory of consciousness to ordinary quantum mechanics (QM)
to give Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) [11-15]. Because BM has a Bohmian
trajectory that bare QM does not have, SBM for a fixed wavefunction has more
possibilities for awareness operators for giving the measure of sets of conscious per-
ceptions. (Conversely, BM seems to require a wavefunction on a configuration space,
or something like it, which QM does not, so in the latter way QM is more flexible.)
However, if a SBM is to give mostly typical perceptions that would also be typical
in a corresponding SQM theory, it seems that there should be at least four features
of the correspondence (listed above), though it is not completely clear that these are
entirely sufficient. Although SBM might conceivably allow a simpler set of aware-
ness operators than SQM, this is by no means obvious, and in other respects SBM
seems to me to be more complicated and ugly than SQM.
I especially appreciate many helpful discussions with Shelly Goldstein, though
he does not share my subjective negative evaluation of Bohmian mechanics. Finan-
cial support has been provided by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council of Canada.
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